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Abstract: The Antitrust Modernization Commission recommends that refusals to deal 
with rivals in the same market should rarely, if ever, be unlawful.  I will focus on the 
principles that should determine the legal standard governing unilateral refusals to deal.  
A legal test that is strongly biased in favor of defendants, as the Commission 
recommends, is desirable as a default rule and especially in cases in which the essential 
facility at the core of the refusal to deal dispute is efficiency enhancing.  However, there 
is another set of cases in which the defendant gains control of an essential market portal.  
In these cases, a legal test that is less biased toward defendants may be preferable to the 
Commission’s suggested approach. 
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On the subject of unilateral refusals to deal, the Antitrust Modernization Commission 
recommends that “refusals to deal with rivals in the same market should rarely, if ever, be 
unlawful under antitrust law, even for a monopolist.”1  The Commission concluded its 
report by endorsing 
 
the longstanding principle that, in general, firms have no duty to deal with 
a rival in the same market.  To the extent that circumstances exist in which 
firms may be liable for a refusal to deal with a rival in the same market, 
the courts should further clarify those circumstances.2 
 
The purpose of this essay is to take up the Commission’s request for further clarification.  
Clarification could take one of two approaches.  One is to set out rules, like the rules of a 
game, that a dominant firm would have to follow in order to avoid liability for refusing to 
deal.3  The other approach would attempt to state a set of principles governing liability, 
leaving it to the courts to define the rules of the game through case law adjudication. 
 
I will adopt the second approach here; that is, I will try to set out principles governing 
liability rather than rules governing conduct.  I take this approach for the following 
reasons.  First, I doubt that it is possible in this area of the law to set out a body of clear 
rules that would channel a dominant firm’s conduct in a manner that would enable it to 
avoid liability with certainty.  For example, if one states as a rule that a dominant firm 
should be immune from liability if it exploits its market position but not if it excludes a 
rival,4 that merely forces a court to distinguish cases of exploitation from exclusion.  The 
clarity provided by such a rule is temporary and largely illusory.  Second, the biggest 
problem in the refusal to deal context is trying to set out principles, not rules guiding 
conduct. 
 
The Commission report does not use the term “essential facility” in its discussion of 
refusals to deal, but I will use it at times below.  Although the term has been the subject 
of criticism5 and the Supreme Court has never recognized the essential facility doctrine as 
an independent theory of antitrust liability,6 the concept remains useful in the area of 
refusals to deal.  The cases involve firms that have market power, and often the source of 
that power is some property or entity that the defendant controls that provides it an 
enormous advantage in the market.  The term essential facility makes it easier to describe 
the property that is at the core of the case. 
 
                                                 
* Keith N. Hylton, School of Law, Boston University, 765 Commonwealth Avenue Boston, MA 02215, 
617-353-8959 (p) 617-353-3077 (f) knhylton@bu.edu 
1 Antitrust Modernization Comm’n Report and Recommendations 101 (2007), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf.  
2 Id. at 104. 
3 See id. at 104 & 115 nn.187-89. 
4 Id. at 104. 
5 Philip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L. J. 841 
(1990).  
6 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004). 
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I will argue here that a legal test that is strongly biased in favor of defendants, as the 
Commission recommends, is desirable as default rule and especially in cases in which the 
essential facility at the core of the refusal to deal dispute is efficiency enhancing.  
However, there is another set of cases in which the defendant gains control of an essential 
market portal.  In these cases, a legal test that is less biased in favor of defendants may be 
preferable to the Commission’s suggested approach. 
 
 
The Law of Monopolization and Refusals to Deal 
 
The Commission report describes the law on refusals to deal by relying on Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. Trinko,7 where the Court held that the defendant did not have a 
duty to deal with rivals.  The Commission report notes that Trinko offered two reasons to 
distinguish the facts in that case from those of Aspen v. Highlands,8 in which the Court 
required the defendant to deal with a rival.  One was that the defendant in Aspen had 
exited a mutually beneficial joint marketing arrangement, while the defendant in Trinko 
did not have the previous experience of being in a joint venture with the plaintiff.9  The 
other was that the defendant in Aspen had rejected an option to sell its service at retail 
price to the defendant, while the defendant in Trinko had not been presented with such an 
option.10  As the Commission report notes, the Court did not spell out precisely what 
these distinctions would mean in future cases.11  For example, it is not clear after Trinko 
whether a decision to exit a mutually beneficial joint venture would imply a violation of 
Section 2 on the part of the dominant firm. 
 
A. General Standards 
 
Looking generally at the case law on monopolization, two broad legal standards appear to 
have been adopted.12  One is the welfare balancing approach introduced into to the law 
by Judge Learned Hand in Alcoa.13  The other is the specific intent approach that existed 
in the monopolization case law before Alcoa.14  In order to better understand the decision 
in Trinko, I think it is necessary to understand what these standards require in the refusal 
to deal setting, and how Trinko fits into these general approaches. 
 
The balancing approach of Alcoa is easy to articulate.  A dominant firm violates Section 
2 of the Sherman Act if the procompetitive or efficiency defenses for its conduct are 
insufficient to outweigh the anticompetitive effects.  Judge Hand did not describe the 
                                                 
7 Id.  
8 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
9 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (“The complaint does not allege that Verizon voluntarily engaged in a course of 
dealing with its rivals, or would ever have done so absent statutory compulsion.”). 
10 Id. at 410 (observing that unlike Aspen’s lift tickets, Verizon’s “services allegedly withheld are not 
otherwise marketed or available to the public”).  
11 Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, supra note 1, at 101. 
12 KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 186-195 
(2003). 
13 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
14 HYLTON, supra note 12, at 186-188. 
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standard in precisely these terms in Alcoa.  Hand’s language was summarized in United 
States v. Grinnell as excusing the defendant from liability when the maintenance or 
acquisition of its monopoly position could be attributed to superior skill, foresight, and 
industry.15  Excessively aggressive efforts to obtain or maintain the monopoly, efforts 
that could not be explained solely by efficiency, would be treated as conduct violating the 
standard.  In Alcoa, the court found that the defendant violated the statute because its 
aggressive expansion and its preemptive enhancement of capacity made it difficult for 
rivals to enter the market and compete against it.  In Hand’s view, the aggressive 
expansion efforts of Alcoa could not be attributed entirely to superior foresight or 
industrial necessity; they reflected a determination to foreclose markets to rivals. 
 
The language of Alcoa has undergone some evolution over the years.  By the time of the 
United Shoe16 decision the courts had begun to focus on exclusionary conduct rather than 
aggressive acquisition. As a signal to potential defendants of what sort of conduct might 
violate the law, the shift toward the term exclusion, rather than aggressive acquisition, 
was probably desirable.  The term exclusion provides notice to potential defendants that 
they may violate the law by taking action that is designed to remove rivals from their 
markets.  In contrast, the term “aggressive acquisition” has broader implications and 
could easily chill any efforts to expand a business. 
 
The Microsoft decision17 reveals another change in the language used by courts to 
describe the monopolization test.  The balancing of anticompetitive effects against 
procompetitive benefits was implied by the test Judge Hand articulated in Alcoa.  The test 
for monopolization was described explicitly as a balancing test in Microsoft: 
 
First, to be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an 
“anticompetitive effect.”… Second, the plaintiff…must demonstrate that 
the monopolist’s conduct indeed has the requisite anticompetitive 
effect…Third, if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case … 
then the monopolist must proffer a “procompetitive justification” for its 
conduct….Fourth, if the monopolist’s procompetitive justification stands 
unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive 
harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit.18 
 
It should be clear that under the welfare balancing test, a dominant firm defendant could 
have a substantial efficiency justification for its conduct, and yet still be found in 
violation of the law.  Of course, the precise method by which a court would balance 
anticompetitive effects against procompetitive benefits has never been explained.  In 
theory, one could estimate the loss in consumer welfare from the defendant’s conduct and 
                                                 
15 United States v. Grinnell Corp. 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (holding that a company’s “growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident” is distinct from 
an illegal monopoly).   
16 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). 
17 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
18 Id. at 58. 
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compare that amount to the gain in efficiency, as suggested by Oliver Williamson.19  
However, courts have not demanded litigants to frame their cases with such precision. 
 
The specific intent approach was the predominant monopolization standard before the 
Alcoa decision, and is primarily responsible for the perception that Section 2 was 
ineffective until the Alcoa decision.20  Under the specific intent standard, a dominant firm 
could be held liable under Section 2 only if the evidence supported the inference that its 
conduct had no significant procompetitive or efficiency justification, and that the sole or 
primary purpose of the conduct was to exclude a rival.  Under the specific intent 
approach, a substantial efficiency justification would immunize the defendant from 
liability under Section 2. 
 
There are modern versions of the specific intent approach that have been proposed by 
scholars.  One is the profit sacrifice test, which seeks to determine whether the 
defendant’s conduct would have been profitable if it did not have an exclusionary 
effect.21  If not, then the defendant should be found liable.  Another version of the 
specific intent approach is the no-economic-sense test, under which the defendant is 
liable under Section 2 if its conduct would not make economic sense unless it had an 
exclusionary effect.22  Yet another version is the equally efficient competitor test, which 
holds the defendant liable only if its conduct would have excluded from its market an 
equally efficient competitor.23 
 
Each version of the specific intent approach attempts to immunize the defendant for 
efficiency or procompetitive features of its conduct.  The specific intent approaches 
would not allow a defendant to be held liable when the exclusionary effect of its conduct 
is primarily attributable to its efficiency characteristics.24  Each of these tests avoids 
balancing efficiency justifications against anticompetitive effects. 
 
B. Trinko Viewed as a Specific Intent Standard 
 
With these two general standards in mind, specific intent and welfare balancing, we can 
return to the Trinko decision to determine which approach the Court adopted.  Recall that 
the second distinction the Court drew between Trinko and Aspen was based on the pricing 
behavior: “In Aspen Skiing, the defendant turned down a proposal to sell at its own retail 
price, suggesting . . . that its future monopoly retail price would be higher.  Verizon’s 
reluctance to interconnect at the cost-based rate of compensation … tells us nothing about 
dreams of monopoly.”25 
                                                 
19 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 
(1968). 
20 See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 12, at 188. 
21 A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and 
Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2005). 
22 Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The “No Economic Sense” Test, 
73 ANTITRUST L. J. 413 (2006). 
23 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 194-95 (2d ed. 2001). 
24 Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657 (2001). 
25 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004).  
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These statements have implications for the issue of antitrust intent.  The refusal to sell at 
retail price does immediately raise a question of intent.  Ordinarily, a firm makes at least 
a normal profit (i.e., recoups its costs, including opportunity costs) by selling at retail 
price, and would not turn down a retail customer unless the cost of the transaction is 
unusually high.  Of the possible motivations behind a refusal to sell to a rival at retail 
price, the intention to injure the turned-down rival is a plausible one.  The Trinko case is 
different because the reluctance to engage with a rival in a transaction that has a negative 
expected profit does not immediately raise the inference of an exclusionary motivation.  
It obviously reflects an unwillingness to suffer a cost in order to aid a rival.  But it does 
not obviously suggest an intention to injure the rival.  In other words, exclusionary intent 
is a highly plausible explanation for the conduct observed in Aspen.26  In Trinko, the 
exclusionary motivation is greatly overshadowed by the more plausible self-interested 
cost minimization motive. 
 
If the second distinction of Trinko is at the core of the Court’s reasoning, then it suggests 
that the Court has adopted the specific intent test for refusals to deal (or dominant firm 
essential facility) cases.  Trinko holds that a dominant firm cannot be found liable under 
Section 2 when its refusal to cooperate with a rival reflects merely a refusal to suffer a 
cost in order to aid or support the rival.  The corollary of this proposition is that in order 
to find a violation of Section 2 when a dominant firm refuses to cooperate with a rival, 
one has to proffer evidence that indicates an intention to injure the rival.  In other words, 
the facts have to suggest that of the available motivations, the intention to injure or 
exclude the rival is a highly plausible one. 
 
Trinko rejects the balancing test of Alcoa.  Under the balancing test, the court would 
compare the justifications offered by the defendant with the anticompetitive effects of its 
actions.  In Trinko, the defendant did not have a substantial procompetitive justification.  
Almost any attempt to balance the (nonexistent) procompetitive justifications against the 
anticompetitive effect would have resulted in a decision against the defendant. 
 
If we look at Trinko in terms of the big picture of Section 2 case law, it implies that the 
monopolization standard has splintered.  Courts still refer to the general balancing test of 
Alcoa as the starting point for monopolization cases.  But in the area of refusals to deal, 
Trinko suggests that the standard has changed and is effectively the specific intent test. 
 
The tests I have described, welfare balancing and specific intent, are simply signals to 
courts on the proper allocation of evidentiary burdens.  A court could easily apply the 
balancing test in a manner that is consistent with the specific intent approach by raising 
the burden of proof on the plaintiff.  However, rather than remain with the same 
balancing test while altering the standard of proof for certain cases, antitrust courts have 
                                                 
26 Of course, this does not mean that exclusion is the only plausible explanation for the refusal to deal.  An 
alternative explanation for the refusal in Aspen is a desire on the part of Aspen Skiing not to allow its local 
rival Highlands to free ride on its investments.  See George L. Priest & Jonathan Lewinsohn, Aspen Skiing: 
Product Differentiation and Thwarting Free Riding as Monopolization, in ANTITRUST STORIES 229, 238-42 
(Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007). 
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adopted different standards that have the same function.  The specific intent test shifts the 
burden of proof against the plaintiff while the balancing test puts roughly similar burdens 
on both parties.  The purpose for shifting the burden is to minimize the costs of erroneous 
decisions. 
 
The question I would like to consider is the normative one of what standard should be 
applied to refusals to deal.  If the standards are really signals to courts on the proper 
allocation of proof burdens, then the underlying reasons for those standards should be 
based on the relative costs of erroneous decisions in favor the plaintiff and in favor of the 
defendant.  Any effort to determine relative error costs requires an examination of the 
economic justifications for the defendant’s conduct and for prohibiting it. 
 
Economics of Refusals to Deal and Antitrust Principles 
 
In this part I will examine the economics of refusal to deal cases.  The term essential 
facility is not used in the Commission report, but I will use it in this part in order to frame 
the cases.  Most of the well known antitrust refusal to deal cases can be described as 
essential facility cases. 
 
The profit generated by a refusal to deal can be attributed to two sources.  One is 
efficiency.  A refusal to deal may protect or enhance the efficiency of an essential facility 
controlled by the defendant, or the refusal may prevent some inefficient outcome in 
general.  The other source is the creation of competition barriers.  A refusal to deal may 
generate profits to the dominant firm by shielding it from competition from a rival.  Let π 
represent the dominant firm’s profits.  Let v represent the benchmark competitive price 
for the dominant firm’s output, which is equal to the marginal benefit to the consumer at 
the competitive level of output.  Finally, let p represent the price and  c represent the unit 
cost of the dominant firm’s output.  The sources of profit can be described by the 
following decomposition:27 
 
Δπ = (Δp – Δv) + (Δv – Δc)     (1) 
 
In simpler terms, this expression says that the short run change in the dominant firm’s 
profits, from a refusal to deal, can be traced to: (1) the enhancement of competition 
barriers, which increases the difference between the dominant firm’s price and the 
competitive benchmark price; and (2) the enhancement of efficiency, which increases the 
difference between the competitive benchmark price (or product value) and the unit cost. 
 
Using this profit decomposition approach, we can separate the refusal to deal cases into 
three categories.  One category involves cases in which the refusal to deal is part of an 
effort to protect or enhance the efficiency of the essential facility.  In terms of the 
decomposition approach, cases in this category involve refusals to deal that either 
improve the value or reduce the cost of the product, or prevent a reduction in value or 
increase in cost (i.e., Δv – Δc > 0).  A second category of cases involves refusals that are 
                                                 
27 See Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Monopolization Standards, (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law 
Working Paper No. 08-18, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1131250. 
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designed to create or enhance barriers to competition.  These refusals either lead to a 
reduction in the value of the product (the competitive benchmark price) to the consumer 
or an increase in the price charged to the consumer (i.e., Δp – Δv > 0).  A third category 
of cases involve a combination of competition-barrier creating and efficiency protecting 
conduct.  Causation is an important legal issue in the tradeoff cases in this third category. 
  
Efficient Refusals to Deal 
 
In cases where the underlying essential facility is efficient, refusals to deal can be 
understood as efforts to protect or to enhance the efficiency of the facility.  The best 
example is Associated Press v. United States,28 which involved a challenge to the 
membership rules governing the Associated Press (AP) news-sharing network.  The 
network was efficient because it permitted a newspaper member of the network to 
simultaneously enhance the quality of a newspaper issue (Δv > 0) and reduce the cost of 
producing it (Δc < 0).   Newspapers without access to the network were unable to offer 
the same quality of news at the price that AP members could offer.  Of course, their 
presence still forced AP to share the efficiency gains with consumers.  The United States 
brought suit to enjoin an AP bylaw that permitted an AP member to veto the membership 
application of a local rival. 
 
In view of the function of the news-sharing network, the refusal to permit a new member 
could have been efficiency protecting.  First, given that it is costly to create such a 
network, the rents earned through its creation may have been necessary to recoup 
development costs.  Cost-reducing innovation gives the innovating firm a period in which 
it earns rents from the innovation, until competing firms are able to mimic it.  The same 
process presumably was at work in the case of the AP network. 
 
The second way in which the refusal to deal may have been efficiency protecting has to 
do with the incentives to contribute to the network.  As a news-sharing network expands, 
it becomes easier for any member to free ride off the efforts of other members.  The 
creators of such a network have an incentive to limit membership in order to prevent the 
dissipation of the network’s efficiencies. 
 
It follows that the potential costs of enjoining the AP membership bylaw are the loss in 
incentives to innovate and the reduction in the network’s efficiency.  The first leads to a 
loss in consumer welfare in the long run; the second to a loss in consumer welfare in the 
short run.  These should be treated as false conviction costs. 
 
Since the network was efficient, one might wonder what gain might come of requiring 
the network to open up to new members.  Requiring new membership could lead to 
competition on a lower cost platform.  The benefits of such competition would go 
directly to consumers.  On the other hand, there is no guarantee that opening up 
                                                 
28 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).  Associated Press involves concerted activity rather 
than unilateral conduct.  Still, the case is useful in this discussion because I am focusing on the essential 
facility at the core of the dispute.  The economic issues I consider here are the same whether the conduct is 
unilateral or concerted. 
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membership would have led to more vigorous competition on a lower cost platform.  The 
result could have been collusive entry; where the new firms that join the network fix 
prices with their local incumbent network members.  Indeed, given that local newspaper 
markets are not large enough to support numerous competitors, the likelihood of 
collusive entry would have been high.  It is not clear that the welfare gains from opening 
entry to new members would add substantially to the gains generated by the creation of 
the network itself. 
 
If we take Associated Press as a representative example of an efficient essential facility, 
the costs of opening access to the facility appear to be as great as and probably greater 
than the potential gains.  Put another way, the false conviction costs of refusal to deal 
lawsuits, in connection with efficient essential facilities, are likely to be high relative to 
the false acquittal costs. 
 
These arguments apply to Aspen, which is another case of an efficient essential facility.  
The joint marketing arrangement between Aspen and its smaller rival Highlands had the 
effect of enhancing the value of the service to consumers.  In terms of the profit 
decomposition approach in (1), the joint-marketing arrangement led to Δv – Δc > 0, 
because the option of skiing all of the mountains owned by the two firms offered a 
superior skiing experience for long-stay customers (destination-area skiers). 
 
The effects of the refusal to deal in Aspen are more complicated.  The essential facility 
was the joint-marketing arrangement.  It did not exist once Aspen refused to continue it 
with Highlands.  One could think of a potential essential facility, which is the combined 
skiing experience over all of the mountains owned by the two firms.  That potential 
facility could exist only when the two firms agreed to a joint venture, or when one of the 
firms took control over all of the mountains. 
 
The refusal to deal could have been exclusionary if the sole purpose for it was to permit 
Aspen to raise prices to consumers in the short-stay ski market (the market consisting of 
local consumers who would visit the mountains for a day or two).  If the refusal made 
Highlands unprofitable as a stand-alone business, Aspen could gain a monopoly in the 
short-stay market. 
 
On the other hand, the refusal to deal in Aspen could have been efficiency protecting if it 
supported the incentives of both parties to make optimal investments to enhance and 
maintain their private facilities.  In the same sense, any refusal to share property with a 
trespasser can be treated as efficiency protecting because it supports incentives to invest 
in the property.  A rule requiring property owners to share land with trespassers would 
diminish incentives to invest in real property. 
 
Aspen was the larger firm and owned three of the four mountains in the area.  Its 
investments were responsible for the majority of long-stay visitors to the mountains.  For 
a joint venture between the two firms to be mutually beneficial, it would have to be on 
terms that permitted Aspen to recoup the costs and to exploit the productivity of its 
investments. 
  9 
 
 
 
The key reason for the termination of the joint venture in Aspen was Aspen’s refusal to 
accept a revenue sharing agreement based on an audit of customer usage of the 
mountains.  But a revenue sharing agreement based on usage would fail to reward Aspen 
for the productivity of its investments, and would permit Highlands to earn a windfall. 
 
Aspen is similar to Associated Press when one examines the false conviction and false 
acquittal costs.  False conviction costs in Aspen can be identified as the diminished 
investment incentives that a sharing requirement would have on Aspen; and conversely 
the encouragement of parasitic deal making to Highlands.  If Highlands enjoyed a 
windfall from the joint venture, it would have no incentive to reduce the amount it 
demanded from the revenue sharing agreement as long as Aspen could not legally exit the 
joint marketing relationship. 
 
The false acquittal costs in Aspen are the welfare losses to long-stay consumers denied 
access to the joint marketing product, and to short-stay consumers who would no longer 
benefit from competition between Aspen and Highlands in the short-stay market.  But the 
first cost is only a short term cost, because in the long term the joint marketing product 
could be kept on the market only under a mutually beneficial contract between the two 
firms.  The second cost is not entirely a cost to society because it reflects the loss in 
Highlands’ appeal when no longer subsidized by Aspen.  To the extent rents were 
transferred from Aspen to Highlands to support a local duopoly in the short-stay market, 
the termination of those transfers is equivalent to the termination of a subsidy to the 
weaker firm.  If consumers enjoyed a greater benefit from the duopoly before rather than 
after the termination, part of that benefit would have to be recognized as a transfer from 
Aspen. 
 
Refusals to Deal as Competition Barriers 
 
There are cases in which the profit resulting to the defendants from the refusal to deal is 
due to the creation of entry barriers.  In American Tobacco Growers v. Neal,29 the 
defendants were given the power to regulate tobacco warehouse sales and used it to block 
the plaintiff’s access to the sales.  The underlying essential facility, access to sales, 
provided no reduction in costs or increase in value.  The defendants did not alter the 
value of the output to the consumer or reduce the cost of supply.  They controlled an 
essential market portal, a point of entry that was necessary for rivals to enter to be able to 
compete with them. 
 
The profits from the refusal to deal in American Tobacco Growers were due to the 
exclusionary effect of the refusal.  In terms of the profit-decomposition approach in (1), 
the change in profits from the defendants’ refusal to deal were the result of the higher 
prices that the defendants could charge when shielded from competition with the 
plaintiff.  The refusal did not, at least in the short run, alter the quality of the output (Δv = 
                                                 
29 Am. Fed’n of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950).  Although this is another case 
involving concerted rather than unilateral conduct, it is useful for this discussion because I am focusing on 
the nature of the essential facility. 
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0), though the long term effect of shielding the defendants from competition probably 
would have been a weakening of their incentives to improve the quality of their tobacco 
(Δv < 0).  The refusal did not serve to protect the efficiency of the warehouse sales.  
There was no evidence that the addition of another firm would adversely affect the 
operation of the auctions (Δc = 0). 
 
While it is true that the addition of the plaintiff would reduce the rents earned by the 
incumbent firms, that should not be considered a welfare loss.  The rents were not 
necessary to induce the firms to create a cost-reducing or value-increasing facility.  
Indeed, allowing the defendants to hold onto the rents earned through exclusion would 
have the undesirable long term effect of encouraging firms to gain control over market 
portals as a monopolizing tactic. 
 
Looking at American Tobacco Growers from the error cost perspective, the case can be 
distinguished from Associated Press in terms of the balance of false conviction and false 
acquittal costs.  If we regard access to the market portal to be the essential facility in 
American Tobacco Growers, the false convictions costs are relatively small because of 
the absence of efficiency justifications.  In contrast, the efficiency justifications for the 
essential facility in Associated Press, the news-sharing network, were substantial and 
obvious.  This implies that the false conviction costs suggested by Associated Press are 
substantially greater than those suggested by American Tobacco Growers. 
 
The false acquittal costs in American Tobacco Growers also appear to be different from 
those in Associated Press.  In Associated Press, the false acquittal costs are the welfare 
gains that might have been realized as a result of enhanced competition within the news-
sharing network.  But this prospect for enhanced competition was unclear, given the risk 
of shirking and free riding, and the risk of collusive entry.  In contrast, the false acquittal 
costs in American Tobacco Growers consist of two components: the consumer welfare 
from enhanced competition within the warehouse system (that would be lost as a result of 
an acquittal), and the incentive to similarly-positioned actors to acquire market portals for 
exclusionary purposes.  As in the case of Associated Press, it is hard to say a priori 
whether the entry of one firm would have produced a net gain to consumers given the risk 
of collusive entry.  However, as additional firms joined the warehouse, more competition 
would eventually result.  In comparison, such a conclusion would not be clear in 
Associated Press given the natural monopoly (or oligopoly) characteristics of local 
newspaper markets.  This implies that the first component of the false acquittal cost, the 
potential gain to consumers, is smaller in Associated Press than in American Tobacco 
Growers.  In addition, the second component of the false acquittal cost, the 
encouragement of rent-seeking, is obviously an important concern in American Tobacco 
Growers. 
 
Legal Standard 
 
Now I will consider the implications of this argument for the appropriate legal test for 
refusals to deal.  In general, the specific intent approach is preferable when the ratio of 
false conviction to false acquittal costs is relatively high.  Thus, in the case of an efficient 
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essential facility, the specific intent test is appropriate.  The reason is that the specific 
intent test reduces the risk of false convictions relative to the welfare balancing test.  And 
since false convictions are likely to be more costly than false acquittals in a case like 
Associated Press, the specific intent approach is preferable. 
 
It follows that the approach of Trinko should be applied to cases in the efficient category, 
such as Associated Press and Aspen.  This implies that any impairment in efficiency (e.g., 
an increase in operating costs) to members in the Associated Press network should serve 
as an excuse for a refusal to deal.  A violation of the monopolization standard should be 
inferred only when the evidence indicates that the primary or sole purpose for the refusal 
to deal was to exclude the rival.  A refusal to suffer a cost in order to aid a rival should 
not be considered a violation of the legal standard. 
 
In the case of a market portal essential facility, the foregoing analysis implies a different 
approach to the standard, or a different standard.  Since the ratio of false conviction to 
false acquittal costs is not obviously high, the welfare balancing standard may be 
preferable to the specific intent standard. 
 
To reduce this to a concrete case, return to American Tobacco Growers.  Under the 
specific intent standard of Trinko, any significant increase in operating costs could be 
used by the defendants as a justification for their refusal to deal.  Such a rule might lead 
to an undesirable outcome in a case like American Tobacco Growers. 
 
The defendants in American Tobacco Growers could have pointed to, and in fact did 
point to, several costs that they would bear as a result of letting the plaintiff into the 
warehouse sales.  The defendants noted that the plaintiff, because he was located outside 
of city bounds, was subject to lower taxes, fewer restrictions, and lower property costs.30  
From the defendant’s perspective, it was reasonable to exclude the plaintiff because he 
would have operated with lower costs, and his business would have expanded relative to 
theirs because of access to the warehouse system.  In addition, the defendants could have 
pointed to the need to schedule time for the plaintiff in the warehouses, which would 
have been a cost associated with admitting the plaintiff.  The defendants had conceded 
that there was ample time to schedule the plaintiff without impairing their allotments of 
time.31  However, the mere cost of coordinating and scheduling could have been asserted 
by the defendants as a cost of dealing with the plaintiff. 
 
If we examine the defendants’ arguments (both real and possible) in American Tobacco 
Growers under the specific intent approach of Trinko, it is not immediately clear that they 
would have been rejected.  The defendants’ arguments should have been rejected because 
they fail to identify a substantial cost or impairment in efficiency for the defendants.  But 
the difficulty is that a court might find that the defendants’ arguments do in fact identify a 
substantial cost or impairment under the analysis of Trinko.  For example, a court might 
find that the mere cost of coordinating and scheduling the plaintiff should be taken as a 
sufficient justification for the decision to exclude the plaintiff from access. 
                                                 
30 Id. at 871. 
31 Id. 
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As this argument suggests, the risk of error has to be taken into account at the level of 
application of the standard.  The specific intent standard appears best when the ratio of 
false conviction costs to false acquittal costs is high.  However, the specific intent test is 
not error free.  Errors can and will occur under any legal standard.  The best test is one 
that leads to the least costly errors in expectation. 
 
The specific intent test of Trinko could generate the right conclusion in American 
Tobacco Growers, and would if it were applied in an error free manner.  But in view of 
the risk that the standard could result in acquittal in instances in which the exclusion is 
almost surely anticompetitive, the specific intent test may be less desirable than the 
welfare balancing test. 
 
Consider the welfare balancing test in the case of American Tobacco Growers.  Under 
this approach, the defendants could offer the same justifications examined above.  
Consider, for example, the justification that the defendants excluded the plaintiff because 
they did not want to suffer the cost of coordinating and scheduling the plaintiff’s 
warehouse time, even though there was time that could be allocated to the plaintiff 
without diminishing the time allotments to the defendants.  Under the welfare balancing 
test, this defense would have to be weighed against the consumer welfare gains of 
enhanced competition within the warehouse system.  In one particular instance, the 
welfare gains from entry may seem small.  As a general proposition, however, the 
welfare gains from entry are substantial.  The welfare balancing test would suggest that, 
in general, the consumer welfare gains from entry outweigh the scheduling and 
coordination costs of the defendants – unless the defendants could produce evidence 
demonstrating that the coordination and scheduling costs were large. 
 
The implications of these cases can be generalized.  In efficient essential facility cases, 
refusals to deal should be examined under the specific intent standard implied by Trinko.  
The efficient essential facility cases include examples such as Associated Press, where 
the facility is the product of joint investments by a group of firms.  This category also 
includes cases in which the defendant has developed an infrastructure, such as an 
electricity transmission grid, that reduces the cost of supplying consumers.  The other 
broad category of essential facility cases involves market portals.  In market portal cases, 
such as American Tobacco Growers and (perhaps) Terminal Railroad,32 refusals to deal 
should be examined under the welfare balancing test, as articulated in Microsoft. 
 
I have so far assumed that it is easy to distinguish efficient essential facility cases from 
market portal cases.  The fact that it may not be easy suggests that a general preference 
for the specific intent standard, in the context of refusals to deal, would be preferable.  In 
free-entry markets for acquisition or development of an essential facility, the presumption 
should be that any such facility is efficient.  In government regulation settings, such as 
that observed in American Tobacco Growers, the presumption of efficiency would not be 
appropriate. 
 
                                                 
32 United States v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
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Suppose the conduct of the defendant involves several acts, some of which are 
exclusionary and others efficiency enhancing?  Should the combination of defendants’ 
actions be considered under the specific intent standard or under the welfare balancing 
test? 
 
For the mixed cases, courts should apply the appropriate standard to each act.  The more 
important issue is the causation standard.  The Microsoft decision suggested that the 
causation test should not stand as a serious barrier to plaintiffs in monopolization cases.33  
If error costs are taken seriously, however, causation should be carefully analyzed in 
monopolization cases.  If the underlying essential facility is efficient – such as the 
Windows operating system – acts designed to exclude access to that system should be 
analyzed under the specific intent standard as a default rule.  The welfare balancing test 
should be applied only if the purely exclusionary acts – that is, the acts that could not be 
attributed to the protection of the facility’s efficiency – could be considered sufficiently 
effective to explain or account for the plaintiff’s injury. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Commission’s conclusion that refusals to deal should rarely if ever be unlawful is a 
useful guiding principle for courts, and the right approach as a default rule.  However, 
when error costs are examined, a more detailed set of principles emerge.  The legal 
standard governing refusals to deal should depend upon the efficiency properties of the 
essential facility at the core of the dispute. 
                                                 
33 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
